Tax by Lenihan, William F. & Green, Robert D.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 33 
Number 2 Washington Case Law—1957 
7-1-1958 
Tax 
William F. Lenihan 
Robert D. Green 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the Taxation-State and Local Commons 
Recommended Citation 
William F. Lenihan & Robert D. Green, Washington Case Law, Tax, 33 Wash. L. Rev. & St. B.J. 188 (1958). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol33/iss2/17 
This Washington Case Law is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law 
Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law 
Digital Commons. For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
TAX
Retail Sales Tax-Construction of Home by Speculative Builder
Not a Retail Sale. In Century Builders, Inc. v. State and Rigby v.
State,' the retail sales tax was held to be not applicable to the sale of
a newly constructed home by a speculative builder. Speculative build-
ers, as distinguished from custom builders, purchase real property, plat
and subdivide it, and offer for sale homes then under construction or
later to be constructed on lots chosen by the purchasers. Custom
builders contract to build homes on land already owned by the pur-
chasers. In the case of speculative builders the purchaser selects the
lot and type of house to be constructed thereon, and enters into an
agreement with the builder for the purchase of the house and lot.
Under the terms of the earnest money agreement, the right of posses-
sion is reserved in the builder-vendor until the transaction is closed.
A specific date for the completion of the construction of the house is
set in the agreement. The completion date usually corresponds with
or is prior to the date of closing. The builder pays the retail sales tax
on the materials which he uses in the construction of the house.
In the Century Builders case the Tax Commission contended that
retail sales tax on the difference between the purchase price of the
house and the cost of materials, less the cost of the lot, is properly
payable by the purchaser. The state's theory was that under RCW
82.04.050 the construction of improvements on real property for a
consumer is a sale at retail. Further, under RCW 82.04.190(4) a con-
sumer is defined, inter alia, as one having a right of possession of real
property. The contract purchaser has a right to possession under his
contract with the builder. Thus, it was asserted, all of the elements
of a taxable sale at retail were present.
On the other hand, the taxpayers contended that the right of pos-
session to realty usually follows the legal title. This is true unless a
purchaser is expressly given the right of possession by contract or is
put into possession by the vendor. The parties stipulated that the
purchasers were not consumers within RCW 82.04.190 by virtue of
being owners, lessees or easement holders.
That the state's position was untenable is indicated by the court's
opinion which gives judgment for the taxpayers without any citation
of authority. On the facts of this case, there would be a retail sale
only if the prospective purchasers had a right of possession in the
149 Wn.2d 707, 306 P.2d 216 (1957).
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realty gained either under the earnest money agreement or by the
vendor having actually put them into possession. The facts clearly
indicate that the latter did not occur. In Litel v. Marsh our court held
that:
The right to possession of realty ordinarily follows the legal title, and
the vendee under an executory contract of purchase is not entitled to
possession of the property unless the contract so provides, or unless he
is placed in possession by the vendor....
In this case, since the right of possession is reserved in the builder until
closing, it follows as a matter of law that the purchasers do not fit
within the statutory definition of consumers.
By the time the purchasers do gain the right to possession in the
realty, the houses have been completed and have become a part of
that realty. As real property, the only taxable event arising from the
sale of houses is a sale of real property. The only tax properly col-
lectible is the one per cent county real estate excise tax.' This tax
is borne by the vendor-builder. But, in fact, it is probably passed on
to the purchaser as a part of the builder's costs. The real estate excise
tax is levied without regard to any retail sales taxes which have been
already paid. The amount of the tax levied is calculated solely on the
sale price of the real property.
The end result of this case is that it affords speculative builders a
successful plan of tax savings for themselves and their purchasers. If
the builder withholds the right of possession from his purchaser until
the house is completed and becomes a part of the real property, a
retail sales tax on the difference between the sales price of the house
and the cost of the materials and the lot is avoided.
The tax saving is substantial. This type of tax planning is bene-
ficial to everyone except the state. The tax saving is beneficial to
the purchasers in that their total purchase costs are reduced. It is
beneficial to the builders because of the reduced costs and overhead.
The building materials supplier is primarily liable for and must report
to the Tax Commission concerning the sales tax on the building
materials.4 The builder need only pay the tax as does any other
233 Wn.2d 441, 446, 206 P.2d 300, 30 (1949) ; see also Welch v. Hoover-Schiffner
Co., 75 Wash. 130, 134 Jac. 526 (1913) ; White v. Coates, 17 Wn.2d 686, 137 P.2d 113(1943).
3 RCV 28.45 and King County Resolution No. 13317, as amended. Conveyance
stamp taxes of $0.50 per $500.00 pursuant to RCW 82.20.010 and $0.55 per $500.00 pur-
suant to 53 STAT. 425, 26 U.S.C. § 3482, are also payable by the vendor-builder. Pre-
sumably the taxes are passed on to the purchaser as a part of the builder's costs.
4 RCW 82.08.050.
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retail purchaser. Thus, there is a further benefit to the builder because
of reduced administrative expenses in not having to account to the
Tax Commission on the sales tax which would otherwise be collected
by him from his purchasers. Counsel for speculative builders, if not
already aware of the device, should avail themselves of it for the
benefit of their clients. The holding of the Rigby and Century Builders
cases is clear and concise. It appears that a contrary result can be
reached only through amendatory legislation.
Taxation-Retail Sales Tax as Tax on Gross Sales of Vendor.
Although the average layman believes that the Washington retail sales
tax is imposed upon the buyer and that the amount of the tax is deter-
mined by calculating a specified percentage of the purchase price, our
court in White v. State' indicated that this view is legally inaccurate. A
tax of three and one-third percent is imposed on the selling price of each
retail sale.' The tax is to be paid by the buyer and collected by the
seller on behalf of the state. If the seller fails to collect the tax or to
pay it to the state, he is personally liable to the state for the amount
of the tax.' However, the amount of the retail sales tax which the
seller must remit to the state is computed on the seller's gross sales,
at retail, during the reporting period, without regard for the actual
amount which the seller has collected, or is entitled to collect, from
those who made purchases at retail from him during the period."
It is apparent that the statutory pattern of the retail sales tax is
anomalous. Although the tax is imposed on the buyer, calculated on
a percentage of the purchase price, the actual tax impact falls on the
seller on the basis of his gross sales, much in the manner of a business
and occupation tax. However anomalous the sales tax may be, the
administrative advantage gained from the Washington tax structure is
apparent. Payment of the tax based on a percentage of the seller's
gross sales is far easier to administer than some alternative method
under which each retail sale must be separately accounted for.
The White case points out the legal anomaly referred to above. The
case further indicates an unfortunate situation concerning vending
machine operators which is produced by this anomaly. The case
involved an action to recover retail sales paid pursuant to RCW
82.32.180. All of the taxpayer's sales were made through the medium
149 Wn2d 716, 306 P.2d 230 (1957) ; appeal dismissed 2 L. Ed.2d 21, 78 Sup. Ct.
23 (1957), for want of a substantial federal question.
2 RCW 82.08.020.
3 RCW 82.08.050.
4 RCW 82.08.070.
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of automatic vending machines. None of the sales exceeded the amount
of thirteen cents. The constitutional issues raised by the taxpayer,
regarding an application of the retail sales tax in a manner which
denied equal protection and due process of law under the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution, are beyond the scope
of this note.
The taxpayer unsuccessfully contended that the retail sales tax was
imposed exclusively upon the purchaser, and that the seller was only
a collection agent for the state. The taxpayer argued that the statu-
tory abolition of tax tokens and the adoption of a bracket system to
determine the amount of tax to be collected by the seller from the buyer
on each sale5 indicated a legislative intent to exempt purchasers from
paying tax on sales of from one to thirteen cents. From this it was
further argued that the legislature did not intend that the seller be
liable to the state for tax on any sales in the one to thirteen cent
bracket because the tax is imposed upon the buyer by RCW 82.08.050.
The court held that the seller must pay the sales tax, computed upon
the seller's gross sales, even though the seller did not collect, and in
fact could not have collected, any tax from his buyers. Nowhere in
Chapter 82.08 is there any indication that sales of less than thirteen
cents are to be exempted from the retail sales tax. The court recog-
nized the distinction between the tax imposed on the seller and the tax
to be paid by the buyer and collected by the seller. The retail sales
tax is imposed on all retail sales not otherwise specifically exempted.'
If the seller fails to collect the tax or cannot collect it from the buyer,
he is still liable for payment of the tax calculated on his gross sales.'
The Tax Commission has consistently interpreted the taxing statute
in accord with the court's opinion. The legislature has several times
amended the statute without disturbing this administrative construc-
tion. However, vending machine sellers are allowed to make the tax
a part of the sales price or to absorb it.8
The statute thus puts vending machine operators at a disadvantage,
taxwise. Whenever the individual sales of this type of vendor are all
within the one to thirteen cent bracket (and they are, in the case of
many such vendors) they must absorb the three and one-third per cent
5RCW 82.08.060, enacted as Wash. Sess. Laws 1951, c. 44, § 2. Tax Commission
Rules Relating to the Revenue Act, Rule 237, provides the tax collection schedule in
accord with the requirements of the statutory provision. In this schedule no tax is to
be collected from the buyer on sales of 13 cents or less.
8 RCW 82.08.020 and 030.
7 RCW 82.08.050.8 Washington Tax Commission Rule No. 187.
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sales tax.' On the other hand, retail vendors making some sales in
the I¢-13 bracket and other sales between 140 and 250 or at 500, to
cite only two examples, collect from their buyers a tax of not less than
four per cent-thus making up for the non-collection in the bottom
bracket sales. Vending machine operators, all of whose sales are in
the bottom bracket, do not have the advantage of breakage, which is
the normal incident of a full-cent bracket system of tax collection.
The only available solution that will aid the vending machine sellers
seems to be amendatory legislation. It has come to this writer's atten-
tion that such a bill is now in the formative stage.
Use Tax-Consumer and Exceptions Thereto Defined-Taxation
of Property Consumed During Manufacturing Process. The case of
Pacific Northwest Alloys Inc. v. State1 involved an action by a tax-
payer to recover payment of use taxes, pursuant to RCW 82.32.180.
The plaintiff manufactured ferrosilicon. Ferrosilicon is produced by
placing scrap iron, quartz, coal, coke and wood chips, in proper
quantities, into an electric furnace. Electric current, introduced into
the furnace by carbon electrodes, produces great heat which causes
a chemical reaction resulting in the formation of ferrosilicon. Carbon
monoxide is a useless by-product of the reaction. The carbon elec-
trodes, which contribute two per cent of the total carbon used, are
consumed in the process. Carbon electrodes are used because they
add no impurities into the furnace during their oxidation, and because
they oxidize at a much slower rate than other electrode materials.
The use tax is levied upon the act of consumption. RCW 82.04.190
(1) defines a consumer, inter alia, for the purposes of the use tax, as
follows:
Any person who... uses an article of tangible personal property other
than for the purpose... (c) of consuming such property in producing
for sale a new article of tangible personal property, or a new substance,
of which such property becomes an ingredient or component or as a
chemical used in processing, when the primary purpose of such chemical
is to produce a chemical reaction directly through contact with an ingre-
dient of a new article being produced for sale; ... (emphasis added)
Based on the above quoted provision, the plaintiff contended that the
carbon electrodes were a chemical used in processing and that their
9 A possible alternative, of course, is to reduce the size or quantity of the commodity
dispensed through the vending machine, and thus, indirectly, effect collection of the tax.
149 Wn.2d 702, 306 P.2d 197 (1957).
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primary purpose was to produce a chemical reaction directly through
contact with the ingredients of the ferrosilicon which was being pro-
duced for sale. The trial court held that the consumption of the carbon
electrodes by the plaintiff fell within the purview of the above quoted
provision of the statute which exempts such consumption from the
use tax imposed by RCW 82.12.020.
Our supreme court reversed the judgment of the trial court. In
deciding that the primary purpose of the electrodes was not to create
a chemical reaction, the court defined primary purpose as that which
is the first intention. The first intention of the electrodes was to convey
electric current into the furnace which in turn produced the heat
necessary to cause a chemical reaction producing ferrosilicon. The
court found it difficult to conceive that carbon electrodes could be
classified as a chemical within the exemption allowed by RCW
82.04.190(1) (c). The mere introduction of the electrodes into the
furnace causes no reaction to occur. In order for the necessary chem-
ical reaction to occur which produces ferrosilicon, not only must the
electrodes directly contact the ingredients, but electric current is also
required to produce the heat necessary to cause the reaction. However,
the court continued, assuming that the electrodes are not a chemical
within the above quoted statutory provision, they furnish only two
per cent of the carbon required in the manufacturing process. The
court ascertained from the stipulated facts that the primary purpose
of the electrodes was to furnish heat; the fact that the electrodes were
consumed in the process and did furnish some of the required carbon
is incidental. The court then stated that the primary purpose of the
electrodes was not to furnish carbon as an ingredient of the ferrosilicon.
In analyzing the Northwest Alloys decision, it is interesting to
note that the previously quoted statutory provision affords two
exemptions from the use tax, namely: consumption of property
".... which becomes an ingredient or component. .. ,, and consumption
of a chemical ". . . used in processing, when the primary purpose of
such chemical is to produce a chemical reaction . . ."' The former
refers to anything which is consumed during the manufacturing process,
but merges with or becomes an ingredient or component of the article
being produced for sale. The latter refers to catalytic agents or the
like. The primary purpose clause refers only to chemicals, not to
2RCV 82.04.190(1) (c).
3 Ibid.
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ingredients or components. Yet our court, in construing the language,
apparently applied the primary purpose clause to all terms. By apply-
ing the primary purpose to all terms, the electrodes were made subject
to the use tax. If the primary purpose clause had not been applied to
ingredients or components, the consumption of the electrodes by the
taxpayer should have escaped the tax. This follows because a portion
of the electrodes became an ingredient of the ferrosilicon during the
manufacturing process.
The following cases lend support to the court's decision. However,
it should be noted that the statutes being construed and applied in
these cases are dissimilar to the Washington statute. In Androscoggin
Foundry Co. v. Johnson' coke, which was used by the taxpayer to
smelt scrap iron for casting, had as its primary purpose the furnishing
of heat for the process. Also carbon in the coke merged with the iron
during the process, making the iron softer and more workable. The
taxpayer contended that the coke became an ingredient of the casting
and was therefore exempt from the use tax. The Maine court stated
that "The fact that in using it as fuel in smelting iron a portion of
the carbon becomes an ingredient of the iron in the process does not
deprive the coke of its character as a fuel."' Under the Maine statute
fuel was subject to the use tax when purchased by a consumer whether
or not it became, in whole or in part, an ingredient or component part
of, or loses its identity in the manufacture of, tangible personal
property.
Another case relied upon as authority by our court was Union
Portland Cement Co. v. State." In this case coal (which produced heat
for cement kilns), fire brick (which lined the kilns), and iron grinding
balls (which were used to grind cement klinkers into the finished
product) were consumed during the process of cement manufacturing.
The taxpayer maintained that coal ash, fire brick and grinding ball
particles were all introduced into and became a part of the cement.
The court held that the above additions to cement, while contemplated,
were an incidental occurrence. Since the articles were consumed by
the manufacturer as the last user, the court held that the use tax
was applicable as in those cases where machinery is consumed during
a manufacturing process even though some of the materials incidentally
become an ingredient of the finished product.
4 147 Me. 452, 88 A.2d 158 (1952).
5 88 A.2d at 160.
6 110 Utah 135, 170 P.2d 164 (1946).
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Another case in point is Smith Oil and Refining Co. v. Dept. of
Finance! A sales tax assessment on the sales of core oil to foundries
was upheld. Core oil was used in foundries to bind sand used as
cores in the molds of castings. Under high temperatures some of the
oil decomposed into carbon and became a part of the iron castings.
The court held that the core oil was not purchased for the purpose of
adding carbon to the finished castings. It was incidental that some
of the oil became a component of the finished product. The tax was
held applicable despite statutory language exempting property for
resale in any form.
A literal reading of the statutory provision at issue in this case
indicates that the primary purpose clause can refer only to chemicals,
not to ingredients or components of the article being produced for
sale. If the court's decision is to be construed as applying the primary
purpose clause to the ingredient or component exception, then the
decision of the Northwest Alloys case is in error. If the court was
attempting to remedy what it conceived to be a defective definition of
consumer, it should have required the Tax Commission to seek its
remedy with the legislature. However, the construction given to the
statutory definition of consumer is consistent with the trend of decisions
which construe statutory language against the taxpayer rather than
liberally in his favor.' If, on the other hand, the court intended only
to hold that the consumption of the electrodes did not constitute a
chemical used in processing, the language used in the decision was con-
fusing, inappropriate and far too broad.
WrLIAm F. LENimN
State Taxation of Exports. In Eardley Fisheries Company v. City
of Seattle' the court sustained the findings of the trial court that seafood
sold to the federal government for export had not yet entered the
"stream of export" at the time of the sale and that its vendor was
therefore subject to the Seattle business tax on his gross sales. The
government's purchase orders provided that the food was "For
Export," and that the food was to be packaged and marked as required
for export purposes. Delivery was not to a carrier but to designated
cold storage depots provided by the purchaser. The sale took place
7 371 IlM. 405, 21 N.E.2d 292 (1939).
s But cf., e.g., Weyerhaeuser Timber Co. v. Henneford, 185 Wash. 46, 53 P.2d 308
(1936).
150 Wn.2d 566, 314 P.2d 393 (1957).
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and the tax accrued at the time of delivery. The food was kept in cold
storage by the purchaser for three to four months, then shipped over-
seas, as contemplated by the parties.
U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2 provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports... [except for inspection fees].
In order that the constitutional prohibition apply, the tax must
accrue while the goods are in the "stream of export." In order for goods
to be in the "stream of export," the cases require that, at the time the
tax accrues, there must be a "certainty" that the goods will be exported.
A contractual duty or a plan to export is not enough. The certainty
required may be established either by (1) the act of delivering the
goods to the carrier for shipment out of the country, or (2) the fact
that the goods are of such a nature that they may not be used in this
country.
The test of the validity of state taxes applied here is not the same
as in commerce clause cases, where the restriction on state taxes is
inferred from the grant of power to the federal government to regulate
interstate commerce. In commerce clause cases, the state is not allowed
to burden interstate commerce, while in the import-export clause cases
the prohibition against state taxes on exports is absolute (except for
inspection costs).'
The seller relied upon A. G. Spaulding v. Edwards' and Richfield Oil
v. State Board.' In the former, the court held that U.S. Const. art. I,
§ 9, cl. 5, prohibited Congress from levying an excise tax on a sale
made to an agent for a foreign buyer where the sale was consummated
by delivery to the carrier for export, because the very act taxed was the
one which established the "certainty" of export. However, the bill of
lading was forwarded to the buyer's agent who could have diverted the
goods. In the Richfield case, the court held a state sales tax invalid as
applied to a sale made by delivery of oil into a tank ship provided by
the foreign buyer. In both of these cases, there could have been diver-
sion, but the U.S. supreme court held that the certainty of export test
had been met.
The Washington court distinguished the above cases on the ground
that the goods had been delivered to the carrier for export at the time
2 Empresa Siderugica v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1949).
8 See Richfield Oil v. State Board, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
4 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
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the tax accrued, while in the instant case delivery was to storage depots.
The court relied on the rule stated in Empresa Siderurgica v. County
of Merced,' where the U.S. supreme court said, "So in this case it is
not enough that on the tax date there was a purpose and plan to export
this property. Nor was it sufficient that in due course that plan was
fully executed."7 In that case the supreme court sustained a property
tax levied on a cement plant which was being dismantled for shipment
to a foreign country, as levied on parts still in the country, even though
part had already been exported and the dismantling was being done by
a common carrier.
The court also distinguished a prior Washington case8 which held
invalid the tax on the sale of a ship to a foreign purchaser, even though
the ship was not transferred to foreign registry until after the sale
took place. The court pointed out that the registry could not be trans-
ferred until after the sale, and that the ship was its own carrier for
export.
In the principal case, the tax was a business tax measured by gross
sales. It might be questioned whether it was a tax on exports at all. A
property tax is directly on the goods which are exports. A sales tax,
where the sale is completed by delivery to a carrier, accrues by the
very act which puts the goods into the stream of export, and is con-
strued to be a tax on the export. A business tax, as in the principal
case, seems more remote from the export, but if it is measured by the
amount of the sale, and the sale puts the goods into the stream of export,
it is probably invalid.9  ROBERT D. GREEN
Inheritance Tax-Estate Planning. In In re Miller's Estate, 151 Wash. Dec. 72, 316
P.2d 124 (1957), a method of inheritance tax saving was approved by our supreme
court. In this case the testator directed in his will that the amount of federal estate
tax due and payable should be deducted from the respective specific bequests. The Tax
Commission contended that the federal estate tax should be deducted from the residuary
estate as is any other debt of the decedent, thereby resulting in a larger inheritance tax.
The court held that the intention of the testator must govern since there is nothing
in the Code, RCW 83.08, which prohibits testamentary direction for the payment of
federal estate tax from any asset other than the residuary estate. In this case the
testator clearly expressed his intention that certain gifts were to go to the named
beneficiaries subject to pro rata contribution for payment of the federal taxes. The
court gave effect to that intention because it is universally recognized that a person
has a right to dispose of his property in any manner which is legally proper.
S Supra, note 3.0 Supra, note 2.
7 337 U.S. 154, at 157.
8 Alaska Steamship Co. v. State, 31 ,Vn.2d 328, 196 P.2d 1001 (1948).
9 See Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
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The tax saving was produced because the specific legatees were Class B and C
beneficiaries, while the residuary legatee was a Class A beneficiary. Charging federal
taxes against the gross specific bequests resulted in smaller net bequests to which the
state inheritance tax could be applied. The net residuary estate, on the other hand,
was larger because the deduction for the payment of the federal taxes had been taken
from the respective specific bequests. Since the inheritance tax rates for Class B and
C beneficiaries are considerably more than those for Class A beneficiaries, the end
result is a successfully executed plan for inheritance tax diminution.
Caveat: An amendment to the inheritance tax code, Wash. Sess. Laws 1957, c. 280,
§ 3, is currently being held in abeyance by Referendum No. 30. If this referendum is
defeated and the amendment goes into effect, the deduction for payment of federal
estate taxes will no longer be available. Thus, the tax saving plan outlined above
would be ineffective.
Business and Occupation Tax-Frozen Food Processing as "Manufacturing." In
Stokely-Van Camp v. State, 50 Wn2d 492, 312 P.2d 816 (1957), the Washington
supreme court was called upon to determine whether the state tax commission, by
a recent ruling, properly classified the processing and freezing of foods as manufac-
turing for purposes of the state occupation tax. The court sustained the action of
the commission by applying the definition of "manufacturing" set out in RCW 82.04.120.
This definition requires that the activity in question result in "...a new, different or
useful article of tangible personal property or substance of trade or commerce." Under
this test, the canning of food products had been classified as "manufacturing" for some
time. The court stated that, by similarly classifying the processing and freezing of
foods, the commission was only recognizing the existence and growth of a new type
of manufacturing.
The court reconciled the Stokely case with two recent Federal circuit court decisions
(holding that the processing and freezing of certain foods was not manufacturing) by
showing that the federal cases involved merely a determination for the I.C.C. in a
carrier dispute and that in those cases the circuit courts did not have a specific statu-
tory definition to apply.
TORTS
Strict Liability Disguised in Terms of Negligence. In LeMaster
v. Chandler' the Washington supreme court made an unusual applica-
tion of tort liability to a defendant common carrier. The result of the
case is a holding of strict liability, disguised in terms of negligence
law. Unfortunately, the negligence reasoning was not in accord with
accepted tort law, and the disguise is easily uncovered.
The plaintiff was the owner of a truck loaded with apples, which
was parked twenty-five feet from the bow of the defendant's ferry
prior to a crossing of the Columbia River. The driver, who remained
in the truck, neglected to put it in gear or to set the brakes. The
defendant's employee neglected to block the wheels of the truck. Dur-
ing the crossing the truck rolled off the ferry with the driver still in the
'.50 Wn.2d 71, 309 P.2d 384 (1957).
[SUMMER
